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Abstract The ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides of
Miletus drew attention to the impossibility of defining a point
of transition between two states or conditions at opposite ends
of a continuum. The ensuing “drawing the line” conundrum—
the sorites paradox—arises from the vague predicates which
humans use to convey concepts. It is argued that “life” is an
indeterminate concept subject to the vagaries of the paradox.
Science communicators and educators need to refrain from
phraseology which connotes a sharp line of demarcation be-
tween nonliving and living or the existence of a discrete
moment in time at which life appeared.
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The Sorites Paradox
Eubulides of Miletus was a contemporary of Aristotle in the
fourth century BCE who was famous for his paradoxes, the
best known being the “liar paradox” (“I am a telling a lie,”
which, if either a true or a false statement, leads to the negation
of the principal assertion). Less well known but the subject of
considerable reappraisal by philosophers over recent years is
the “sorites paradox”: beginning with a pile of stones and
removing these one stone at a time, one moves from a pile
to a non-pile, but it is impossible to specify the individual
stone; the removal of which effects the transition. Moreover, if
no one stone can be identified which separates the “pile” from
the “not a pile” state, then neither can the stone on either side
thereof (or two, three or more stones removed) be designated
as being so. Another classical example of the paradox is the
transition from baldness to hirsuteness: no given strand of
hair, when moving from a bald head to a hirsute one, can be
identified as bringing about the change of condition. And yet
the difference between a pile of stones and a handful of stones,
or a bald head and a luxuriant one, is readily observable.
The sorites paradox draws attention to the impossibility of
defining the precise moment of transition from one state to
another when there is a continuum between the two. In se-
mantic terms, the paradox applies to concepts with vague
predicates (Hyde 2011). Terms such as “pile” and “hirsute”
do not have clear boundaries. They may be envisaged as
convenient descriptors of phenomena in overtly recognizable
form, but cannot be precisely delineated. Words being con-
veyors of concepts, the spotlight then shifts to the preciseness
of human concepts. The enlightenment and logical positivism
ushered in a period when it was thought that the world could
be described in Euclidean terms, i.e., one of pat, precise
definitions (Hogan 1994). But the real world does not conform
very well to such an ideal; most natural states or conditions
describe continua between arbitrarily defined extremes. Hu-
man concepts are usually commensurately vague, and “where
there is vagueness, there looms the sorites” (Hogan 1994 162).
A practical corollary of the sorites paradox is that there is no
point in looking for sharp boundaries where these are, by
definition, nonexistent (Hyde 2011). To use common par-
lance, we should not attempt to “draw the line” as there is
no clear “line” to be drawn.
Life as a Soritean Phenomenon
Does the sorites paradox apply to the distinction between
“living” and “nonliving”? In the days when the vital force
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concept ruled, the answer to that question was firmly in the
negative, as the distinction resulted from the presence or
absence of a discrete entity, albeit a nebulous one. The
difference between the two conditions was seen as a quali-
tative rather than a quantitative one. With the abandonment
of vitalism, “life” came to be described more in process terms,
i.e., what life does rather than what life is. The problem with
this approach is that there does not appear to be any charac-
teristic intrinsic and unique to life (Schulze-Makuch and Irwin
2008). A growing seed crystal in a school lab exhibits some of
the characteristics of life: it grows, and moreover does so by
absorbing and assimilating substances from its environment in
such a way that there is a decrease in entropy—a sophisticated
aspect of life. There are also the viruses to challenge any
succinct definition of life in that they so clearly invoke a gray
zone between the two states, exhibiting as they do so few
“process” aspects of life. Even adding the capacity for evolu-
tion to the list of life attributes does not necessarily solve the
problem as in a very simple state there may be reproduction
without replication, thereby nullifying any Darwinian mecha-
nism (Cleland and Chyba 2002 but cf. Bobrik et al. 2008 who
make a theoretical case for Darwinian evolution at the molec-
ular level).
Intelligent design theory may be regarded as a resurgence
of the vitalist mindset in that it too posits a sharp line of
demarcation between living and nonliving via its “irreduc-
ible complexity” clause. But life is a vague predicate and so
no line of demarcation can be said to exist. Between a
crystal and a eucaryotic cell, there exists a plethora of levels
of organization; how we define life is likely to remain “no
more than a matter of linguistic choice” (Cleland and Chyba
2002, 391). Life would appear to be a perfect candidate for
the sorites paradox.
While hair-splitting over the definition of life is not
particularly consequential when dealing with living entities
that we know well in the world around us, developments in
abiogenesis research brought a fresh impetus to bear on the
issue as “the need became apparent for a definition that
distinguishes between living and nonliving states, since that
boundary (at least in concept) had to be crossed at some
point in the past” (Schulze-Makuch and Irwin 2008, 12). In
the heady early days of nineteenth century abiogenesis, the
line was thought to have been crossed almost instantaneous-
ly when a given level of biochemical complexity was
attained through simple organic substances organizing
themselves into a cellular structure (bearing in mind that
cell ultrastructure had hardly been elucidated at that time).
Thus, when Haeckel “saw” the “organism” Bathybius
haeckelii, there was no great surprise involved, as he had
hypothesized that new life forms were constantly being
spontaneously generated in seabed oozes; enigmatically, he
saw no fundamental difference between living and nonliv-
ing anyway (Rehbock 1975; note also the hint of ongoing
abiogenesis in Wächterschäuser 1988). We have come a
long way since then. Drawing on the ideas of Oparin, Miller
(1953) put abiogenesis on an experimental footing with his
seminal laboratory work in which five amino acids were
produced from a mixture of primordial gases, a line of
inquiry which soon led to more refined experimental
designs and commensurately more complex organic com-
pounds. Theoreticians have increasingly tended to focus
more on the evolution of biochemical processes than on
the genesis of biochemical molecules (e.g., Fox 1981; Flei-
schaker 1990; Wächterschäuser 1988). Abiogenesis models
now focus on a protracted, incremental transition from simple
chemical systems with low levels of organization to cellular
structures via systems of gradually increasing complexity and
autonomy (see e.g., Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004; Schulze-Makuch
and Irwin 2008). Terms such as “prebiotic,” “protocells” and
“precursor organisms” (Wächterschäuser 1988) abound in the
abiogenesis literature, mostly in connection with organic en-
tities and processes which already exhibit some characteristics
of life. To quote Schulze-Makuch and Irwin (2008 15), “There
was probably no sharp line but rather a gradual transition
between a living and a non-living state of matter at the origin
of life.”
Implications for Science Communicators and Educators
Evolutionary biology is no stranger to soritean reasoning. In
the evolutionary context, any taxonomic predicate is neces-
sarily vague. To use the hackneyed ape-to-human transition
as an example, the definition of both “ape” and “human” are
arbitrary ones with ill-defined boundaries. The demarcation
may, however, appear to be a clear one to an observer
ignoring the temporal sequence between the two, which exists
only in the remote past and is accordingly not visible, at least
not to the untrained eye. The tendency of paleontologist to
assign species names to every fossil find actually reinforces
the illusion of clear boundaries as the posited sequence then
implies “quantum leaps” from one discrete entity to anoth-
er. Paleontologist, themselves recognize perfectly well that
their “species” do not necessarily correspond to the stan-
dard classroom definition of a species, but most lay people
—and perhaps some teachers—do not appear to be aware of
the distinction.
The main focus of this article is, however, the application
of the sorites paradox to life itself. For many people, the origin
of life remains a major stumbling block to the acceptance of
the evolutionary paradigm (Rice et al. 2010). Biological and
chemical evolution are conflated in the public mindset, a
situation at least in part attributable to the failure of much
science education to come to grips with the distinction be-
tween the two (Vlaardingerbroek 2010). As long as life
remains viewed as a discrete state, intuitive logic will continue
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to demand both a sharp line of demarcation between it and
nonlife, and a definitive point of transition from one to the
other locatable in precise time. The expression “the origin of
life” in itself becomes problematic as it implies a definable
“crossing of the line.” Statements appearing in authoritative
popular scientific literature—in this instance, Scientific
American—such as, “It is virtually impossible to imagine
how a cell’s machines, which are mostly protein-based cata-
lysts called enzymes, could have formed spontaneously as life
first arose from non-living matter around 3.7 billion years
ago” (Ricardo and Szostak 2009) exacerbate the situation.
While unintended, the message conveyed by the second part
of this sentence feeds into common misconceptions
concerning both the arbitrary nature of life and the sudden,
dramatic appearance thereof at a discrete point in time. The
same may be said for textbook, classroom, and science media
expressions such as “the first living cells.”
It may seem semantically pedantic, but given that con-
cepts and their concomitant “definitions” are by their very
nature imprecise (Cleland and Chyba 2002; Hyde 2011);
science communicators and educators need to revisit their
phraseology with a view to avoiding the use of clichés
which imply clear-cut boundaries where there are none.
With regard to the origin of life, the geologic time scale
throws us a lifeline: to claim that life “appeared” circa 3.7
billion years ago is hardly committing oneself to a discrete
moment of transformation. It merely connotes that there
were probably no biochemical systems to which the soubri-
quet living would be applied 3.8 billion years ago while,
200 million years later, there were in existence structures to
which the term could be arbitrarily applied. The line that
was crossed is a fuzzy one, at least in temporal terms, even if
the timescale for abiogenesis is reduced to millennia rather
than millions of years (as claimed by Emeline et al. 2003).
The transition from Euclidean reasoning to soritean rea-
soning is part—perhaps a defining feature—of intellectual
maturation, certainly in the context of an understanding of
modern biology. At lower levels of schooling, it is permis-
sible to speak of what makes one thing living and another
not. By the later stages of secondary schooling, and
certainly at the tertiary stage, it is no longer so, and students
need to be made aware of the indeterminateness of the
concept of life. The classroom treatment of abiogenesis
presents an excellent opportunity to do just that.
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